Arguments on the parties’ credibility

The plaintiffs’ legal representatives started their closing arguments by supporting the Prosecutor’s case for the conviction of Ousman Sonko for crimes against humanity.

In general, it was argued and illustrated that Ousman Sonko had repeatedly and deliberately misled the Swiss prosecuting authorities from the beginning of the investigation. He was also selective with the evidence collected – including of the TRRC findings – and only used it when they were suiting him. He also regularly shifted the responsibility to others.

On the 14 April 2016, the defendant’ testimony was inconsistent in many respects. For example, he stated that he had to flee the country because he had refused orders of the President – the orders that corresponded to the written notes found with his personal belongings to hand over the detainees to the NIA – then, he explained that he could remember the deployment of the PIU as riot control where the demonstration had taken place. He later decided not to comment further. He was also unwilling to provide information about his telephone contacts on 14, 16 and 19 April 2016, while on the latter date, his phone analysis showed that a call had been transferred to “DG NIA”. His memory also remained selective with regard to other details, in particular, his whereabouts on the date of the events. Indeed, while he explained that he was not present at the PIU on 14 April, he explained that he was there on 16 April – on a Saturday – to do “absolutely nothing”. During another hearing, he stated that he was there “because of this unauthorized demonstration”.

Other examples were given to highlight the defendant’s lack of credibility regarding these events, throughout the trial. In particular, in light of the available evidence, it was not credible that he only learned of the death of one of the detainees on 16 April 2016, as the rumor of his death had spread rapidly among the public and the UDP. Similarly, it is absurd and contradictory to claim that he only learned of the torture of other plaintiffs during the course of the Swiss investigation, particularly considering the numerous reports published on the subject as early as April 2016.

Ousman Sonko’s claims that his subordinates – the then Director of Prison and the former IGP – acted on their own authority or without his consent were unrealistic and clearly contradicted by the evidence gathered. Moreover, both testified before the TRRC that there were serious and systematic police failures in relation to the crimes committed under the Jammeh regime.

Despite the accused’s attempts to absolve himself of responsibility, the available evidence in the case also clearly showed that it was the Minister of the Interior who coordinated the cooperation between the NIA and the police, including the cover-up of the torture.

Contrary to the statement of the accused, the plaintiffs provided the prosecuting authorities with accurate and detailed accounts of the events they experienced. This was also the case with the plaintiff who died in 2023.

Arguments on the contextual elements and on the specific crimes in question

After recalling the legal criteria for qualifying an “attack against the civilian population” (see previous highlights), it was argued that it was not legally required that such an attack would have been part of an explicit formal policy. Indeed, as had already been argued, the existence of such a policy could well be implicit.

From the case file, it was concluded that attacks against the population began at the latest in 2000 and continued until 2016, spreading to all regions of The Gambia and affecting a large number of people, both civilians and military (considered civilians in peacetime). As recently as 14 April 2026, 26 to 29 people were arrested, and on 16 April 2016, 19 people were arrested. Thus, the attack had to be considered widespread.

It should also be noted that the attack became more sophisticated over the years, with the Gambian police – particularly the PIU – playing an essential and indispensable role in the well-oiled machinery of repression.

Indeed, it was central to the repression of the Jammeh regime that both the police and the special forces of the PIU, as well as the prisons, cooperated with the NIA. It was also notorious that people detained at the NIA were tortured, and it was an integral part of the repression that opposition activists, journalists, and others perceived as opponents of the regime disappeared for months at a time, particularly at Mile 2, where they were largely or completely isolated from the outside world and held incommunicado in inhumane conditions. The judiciary was also part of the system, which was particularly highlighted in the findings of the TRRC. Thus, the attack had to be considered systematic.

Arguments on the individual offenses

Although the accused denied his criminal responsibility for all the crimes that took place on 14 April 2016, he did not deny that the plaintiffs were victims of torture and that one of them died as a result of these acts. Nevertheless, he believed that he could evade his responsibility by arguing that the arrests were lawful because the demonstration was not authorized and because the responsibility for the torture rested solely with the NIA, but these arguments were weak, especially since the prohibition of torture also applies when persons detained with the accused are handed over to torturers (so-called outsourcing of torture to third parties), which was the case on 14 April 2016 with the involvement of Ousman Sonko.

The deprivation of liberty suffered by the plaintiffs after their arrest, both at the NIA and at Mile 2, violated the most basic rules of international law, as well as Gambian procedural rules. Moreover, the plaintiffs were not brought before a court until May 2016, well beyond the three days allowed by law, were severely injured, and the court hearing clearly violated fundamental rules of international law, as the plaintiffs’ statements used by the court were taken at NIA in the context of or under the impression of torture – an element confirmed by the TRRC investigations – which is prohibited under international law.

Regarding the inhumane conditions in which the plaintiffs were kept during their detention – amounting to torture as crime against humanity – it was recalled that they were all detained as political prisoners, with no access to their families or lawyers, no serious medical treatment and difficulties to access food. These custodial conditions massively prolonged their suffering caused by torture and exacerbated by the lack of essential treatment and the plaintiffs had only been released months after their arrest, only once Yahya Jammeh had lost the elections.

The accused could not evade his responsibility in this regard by saying that he had done what he could to improve the conditions of detention, as the plaintiffs were simply not held in normal prison conditions but were treated particularly badly especially because of their status: they were critics of the government and dared to speak out against Yahya Jammeh and his dictatorship.

Ousman Sonko had clear knowledge of the context in which the crimes were committed in April 2016 and it was also proven that he had the requisite intent to commit torture, murder, to deprive the plaintiffs of their liberty and subject them to harsh conditions.

These crimes must be qualified as aggravated in view of the brutality of the acts of torture committed – sometimes combined with sexual violence and the use of various objects to beat the victims – which led to the death of one person, which causes were concealed, and in view of the ruthless character of the Jammeh’s repressive regime.

Arguments on the modes of liability

The role of the accused as co-perpetrator in the commission of the offenses in question was discussed.

In particular, it was recalled that Ousman Sonko had held a high position for many years and was very influential in 2016. He had been in charge of the police, the PIU and the prison services, whose heads reported directly to him and were bound by his instructions. The accused was a close associate and confidant of Yayha Jammeh as well as a loyal servant of the system. He had committed atrocities himself– at least at the beginning of his career, and later had delegated or facilitated them, even helping to cover up the crimes. It was further pointed out that the torture under the Jammeh had always been carried out in close cooperation and coordination between the police, prisons and the Junglers or the NIA. Ousman Sonko himself had been in close contact with the NIA, as if he had been a central actor of the cooperation between the various forces. Indeed, as highlighted by the investigation, the accused made a decisive contribution to the establishment, development and survival of the Gambian repressive regime.

The above contradicted with Ousman Sonko’s claims that he had only a decorative role at the head of the Ministry of the Interior, which were not credible and once again pointed out to the inconsistencies coming out of his testimony regarding his operational role as Minister.

With regard to the 14 April 2016, the available evidence established that Ousman Sonko had been present at the PIU on the exact day of the events but more importantly that he had given specific – or at least blanket – instructions for the plaintiffs to be taken to the NIA headquarters, respectively to Mile 2 Prison and from there to the NIA headquarters. He had done so in the knowledge that persons apprehended by the NIA were regularly subjected to severe violence and torture. However, it is not decisive whether the accused had authority over the NIA or not, the only relevant point is that it was his subordinate officers from the PIU and Mile 2 who had handed over the plaintiffs to the NIA, where they were subsequently tortured and killed, or kept in detention.

Legally, such conduct was consistent with the case law and literature applicable to the co-perpetrator.

Furthermore, it was argued that if the accused’s version – according to which he did not know anything on the day of the events, but had been informed that a violent demonstration was taking place and had done nothing at the time, while two days later he had rushed to the PIU office because he was worried about another demonstration taking place – was accepted by the court, such passive behavior should also lead to his criminal responsibility, since he was the one responsible.

Subsidiarily – and finally – it was argued that his criminal responsibility could be derived from his position of hierarchical superior.

In support of this argument, it was explained that, as Minister of the Interior, he had to be regarded as a “manager within the administration”, that the transfer of the detainees to the NIA had been carried out by his “subordinates”, and that there was a direct legal and factual superior-subordinate relationship between the police/prison officers and the accused. It was further argued that his subordinates handed over the detainees to the NIA in the full knowledge that brutal torture was regularly taking place. Similarly, the subsequent illegal detention was ensured by the defendant’s subordinate prison staff, both at Mile 2 and Janjahbureh, over whom he had effective control. In this sense, it is clear from the case file that Ousman Sonko did not intervene to stop the illegal acts committed by his subordinates (prevention – a priori of the crime), nor did he take any measure to punish those involved (prosecution or administrative sanction – a posteriori), while he himself knew not only of the attack against the civilian population, but also that the NIA was a torture agency and that the applicants were being deprived of their liberty.

The final words were addressed to the plaintiffs, who were described by their lawyer as incredibly courageous and resilient individuals – both at the time when they suffered these horrific crimes and throughout the proceedings in Switzerland.

Coming next: The closing arguments of the Defense.