Following the court’s instruction for the charge sheet to be amended, Mr. Ebrima Dibba, the deputy national organising secretary of the opposition United Democratic Party (UDP), entered a not guilty plea to the sedition charge brought against him by the Inspector General of Police (IGP).

The Inspector General of Police (IGP) charged Mr. Dibba on Wednesday, June 5, 2024, with Seditious Intention under section 51(1)(a) of the Criminal Code Volume One, Laws of The Gambia 2009, which is punishable by section 52(1)(b) & (c).

According to the IGP, Dibba produced and released a WhatsApp audio in May 2024 in which he called the President “greedy, immature, rude, and foolish,” with the intention of inciting disdain for the Government or the President.

Before a plea was taken, Dibba’s lead attorney, Counsel Borry S. Touray, declared that the company will contest the charge. Touray contended that the offence specified in section 52 is an actual offence, and the charge under section 51(1) is just a definition. He asked the court to drop the accusation since it gave the court no authority to impose any kind of criminal penalty.

In response, Commissioner Sanneh, speaking on behalf of the IGP, maintained that the accusation was legitimate and cited sections 51 and 52 to back up their claim. He asked the court to accept Dibba’s plea and reject Counsel Touray’s submission.

Principal Magistrate Muhammad Krubally of the Banjul Magistrate’s Court rendered his decision on the oral application submitted by Ebrima Dibba’s legal team on Thursday, June 6, 2024.

Principal Magistrate Krubally ruled in favour of Counsel Borry S. Touray’s contention that Ebrima Dibba was accused in error.

“Now, the question is whether prosecution under Section 51 Subsection 1(a) against the Accused is the correct one, going so far as to be penalised under Section 52, or not? Or is Section 52—quoted by Learned Senior Counsel BS Touray—the appropriate one? It is relevant, in my opinion, for me to ask myself this question: why is a criminal accusation brought against an individual? The best course of action is to let them know about the offence, improper action, or words said that violated the current laws of the country.

“Based on this response, it is crucial for any authority that has the authority to file charges against someone to exercise extreme caution and awareness of the offences when doing so. This is because the individual against whom the charges are to be filed will ultimately be assessed by the legal system and the public, which could paint him in a bad light for those who are impatient,” Principal Magistrate Krubally stated.

Principal Magistrate Krubally stressed the significance of charging people with crimes only when the relevant laws are the basis for the charges.

He cited the Abdoulie Conteh versus the State 2002/08 Gambia Law Report volume 1 case, in which Justice Agim indicated which part should be used in the event that charges be brought.
According to Krubally, this problem started when the accused was charged under Criminal Code Section 252. An objection was raised, stating that since part 245 is the definition part that applies to the charges, it should have been used instead of Section 252, which was the incorrect offense-creating section.

According to Principal Magistrate Krubally, His Lordship decided that: “It is well-established law that the appropriate section for accusing someone of a crime is the one that creates the offence. The Criminal Procedure Code’s Section 113 (1)(a) contains the necessary legal provisions for this. As a result, I have no question that Count 2 is legitimate and sustained.

“After considering the aforementioned, I have concluded that the prosecution’s interpretation of Section 51 Subsection 1 (a) of the Criminal Code, which is how the accused (Ebrima Dibba) was charged in this case, is completely incorrect. I wholeheartedly concurred with Learned Senior Counsel BS Touray for the Accused that clause 52, which is the clause that creates an offence, should be used to charge the accused.

“I would want to take this opportunity to thank the Learned Counsel for providing appropriate guidance regarding the application of the law in this particular context. I acknowledge that the prosecution has not yet cited Section 52 as a punishable section in the definition section in order to charge the accused, so I will not dismiss this case for lack of competence. Rather, I direct the prosecution to make the necessary changes, after which the accused enters a plea. Principal Magistrate Krubally decided that the accused’s bail should be increased in the meantime.

Superintendent Almamy S. Manga told the court that the prosecution would file an application under section 169 of the Criminal Procedure Code to change the section 51 subsection 1(a) of the statement of offence to section 52 subsection 1(b) and (c) of the Criminal Procedure Code. This was based on the decision made by the court.

Then Superintendent A.S. Manga asked the judge to grant their request. Principal Magistrate Krubally approved the application after Ebrima Dibba’s solicitors did not raise any objections.

Following the prosecution’s oral request under section 169 1 of the criminal code to amend, among other things, section 51 1(a) of the criminal code, to which the accused has been charged, and if section 51 1(b) and (c) are accepted without objection from the defence attorney, the prosecution’s request to amend is subsequently approved under section 169 of the criminal procedure code. As a result, the defendant is free to enter a plea. Principal Magistrate Krubally declared that “either the accused or his counsel can inform the court of the position or plea of the accused as per the charge before the court.”

One of Ebrima Dibba’s solicitors, Counsel Abdul Aziz Bensouda, told the court that they will be entering a not guilty plea.

Principal Magistrate Krubally emphasised Ebrima Dibba’s fundamental right to the presumption of innocent until proven guilty after making this announcement. As a result, he pleaded not guilty on Dibba’s behalf and reminded the prosecution that it was their responsibility to establish the accused’s guilt.

The prosecution, however, voiced its displeasure with Counsel Bensouda’s entry of a plea on behalf of his client. Superintendent A.S. Manga asked the judge to allow Dibba to submit his plea in person.

“Your Presence” Even after the charge sheet was modified, the accused’s attorney notified the court that the amended charge sheet was deemed read. Additionally, the accused’s plea of not guilty to the charge was deemed insufficient in the eyes of the prosecution. Superintendent A.S. Manga said the court, “We still believe the accused should be allowed to take his plea himself, having read the same to him all over.”

Principal Magistrate Krubally responded by ruling that Counsel Bensouda may enter a plea on behalf of Ebrima Dibba because he is acting in that capacity.

“With all due respect, prosecution attorney AA Bensouda told the court that we take the modified statement of offence as read and that the accused enters a not guilty plea when asked about the prosecution’s stance or plea to the new charge.

The procedure herein is unaffected in any manner, according to the court, because the modified statement of offence only affects the specifics, leaving the rest unchanged. Principal Magistrate Krubally declared that “the accused represented by counsel as his mouthpiece is sufficient.”

The matter was then postponed until July 2, 2024, by Principal Magistrate Krubally, in order to provide for a hearing.